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THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY’S CANADIAN
ENTITLEMENT: THE ROLE OF LIBERALIZED
AND INTEGRATED NORTH AMERICAN
ELECTRICITY MARKETS IN A NEW
CALCULATION
Kevin Kirkpatrick
ABSTRACT: The Columbia River Treaty between the United States and
Canada may be terminated unilaterally by either nation beginning next year;
this has brough attention within the Pacific Northwest and beyond to the 1964
agreement on river flows. Much of the discussion about updating the accord
highlights important goals such as bettering the protection of fish and increasing
public participation in ecosystem governance, but often neglects analysis of how
electricity markets have changed over the past fifty years. This Comment,
through an examination of key developments in utilities law and application of
economic theory, attempts to parse principles that may prove helpful in finding a
solution to the agreement’s most contentious element—the “Canadian
Entitlement” payments from the U.S. to British Columbia—from the puzzle of
the Columbia River Treaty’s electricity piece.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1964, the U.S. and Canada put into force the Columbia
River Treaty (Treaty) to coordinate hydroelectric power
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generation and flood control on the largest river flowing
through the Pacific Northwest. 1 The Treaty increasingly draws
the attention of legal scholars both because it can be
unilaterally terminated by either nation as soon as 2014 and
because many regard its focus as too narrow to accurately
reflect how North American rivers are now managed. 2
Commentators in the fields of law and policy have pointed out
that the regulatory regime governing the Columbia has
changed greatly since the TREATY took effect and have
argued that any new agreement needs to consider
environmental goals as well as governance arrangements that
were not in place in the 1960s.3 On the American side of the
49th Parallel, for instance, transformative federal laws like the
Endangered Species Act and Northwest Power Act did not
even come into existence until years after Treaty ratification.4
Much less scholarship is available, however, about another
important regulatory trend that during the past half-century
reshaped the North American utilities industry: the
integration and liberalization5 of American and Canadian
wholesale electricity markets. This Comment begins to fill that
gap, arguing that keeping in mind changes to both the physical
and legal infrastructure of power supply in the U.S. and
Canada in the past half-century is important to addressing one
1. Treaty Between the United States of America and Canada Relating to
Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin, U.S.Can., Sept. 16, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1555 [hereinafter Treaty]; FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER
POWER SYSTEM (BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
AND U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS), THE COLUMBIA RIVER SYSTEM INSIDE STORY 4
(2001) [hereinafter FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM].
2. See, e.g., Nigel Bankes, The Flood Control Regime of the Columbia River Treaty:
Before and After 2024, 2 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Rachael Paschal Osborn, Climate Change and the Columbia River
Treaty, 2 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 75, 78-79 (2012).
4. A. Paul Firuz, Looking Forward: The Columbia River Treaty, 2 WASH. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 170 (2012).
5. The term “liberalization” is used here, though “restructuring” is another word that
appears in some scholarship referring to the same general lessening government
control in a specific sector of the economy in favor of more market-oriented approaches.
In the U.S. and Canadian power and utilities industries, “deregulation” is more
common than either “liberalization” or “restructuring” but it is not used
interchangeably with those two words in this Comment since “deregulation” does not
necessarily encompass related changes like free trade agreements that “liberalization”
does. “Liberalization” for the purposes of this Comment, however, does not include
privatization, though that is a connotation that sometimes comes with the word in the
U.K.
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of the Treaty’s most thorny issues, the calculation of the
“Canadian Entitlement” downstream power benefits paid each
year to British Columbia by the U.S.
As the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) prepare to jointly deliver to
the U.S. Department of State a final recommendation on a new
Treaty in December 2013, 6 discussing not only what Columbia
hydropower is worth in 2013 but why its value is so different
from what treaty negotiators predicted in the 1960s can
potentially help with this piece of a new agreement. Looking at
the problem through the lens of one major trend in utilities law
lends support to some of the principles laid out by the BPA and
USACE in their draft recommendation while underscoring the
fact that continuing an inflexible and un-adaptable calculation
is unlikely to help the price tag of a new agreement
approximate the reality of its rewards over the long term.
II.

HISTORY: HOW THE TREATY CAME TO BE

Detailed, well-written accounts of the origins, operations,
and governance of the Treaty system are readily available
elsewhere7 so this Comment will strive to be brief in orienting
the reader with the system’s historical, physical, and legal
dimensions. Still, a few pertinent points about the Treaty’s
origins and how it functions today bear mention here.
Many identify the 1948 catastrophic flooding of the riverside
cities of Vanport, Oregon and Trail, British Columbia as a
primary catalyst for the creation of the Treaty. 8 Others draw

6. U.S. Entity (Bonneville Power Administration and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
[hereinafter U.S. Entity]), Columbia River Treaty Review Working Draft of a Regional
Recommendation: Improving the Columbia River Treaty, June 27, 2013, available at
http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/Files/CRTR%20working%20draft%20
recommendation,%20June%2027%202013.pdf; U.S. Entity, Sept. 20, 2013, Columbia
River Treaty Review Draft Regional Recommendation, available at http://www.crt20142024review.gov/DraftRegionalRecommendation.aspx.
7. See generally, e.g., Paul W. Hirt and Adam M. Sowards, The Past and Future of
the Columbia River 115; Jeremy Mouat, The Columbia Exchange: A Canadian
Perspective on the Negotiation of the Columbia River Treaty, 1944-1964, in THE
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED: TRANSBOUNDARY RIVER GOVERNANCE IN THE
FACE OF UNCERTAINTY 14 (Barbara Cosens ed., 2012) [hereinafter THE COLUMBIA
RIVER TREATY REVISITED].
8. See, e.g., James D. Barton and Kelvin Ketchum, The Columbia River Treaty:
Managing for Uncertainty, in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED, supra note 7,
at 43.
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attention to the strong interest of the U.S. in the 1950s and
1960s in developing a large hydroelectric dam in Libby,
Montana and its corresponding need for Canadian consent to
create a trans-border reservoir and interfere with BC Hydro’s
plans to divert part of the Columbia into the Fraser River. 9
Still others emphasize that, at the time of Treaty negotiations,
the Social Credit government of British Columbia Premier
W.A.C. Bennett was seeking to build dams on several
tributaries of the Columbia but lacked the capital to start
those projects. Unable to secure that funding in Canada,
according to this analysis, Bennett in effect used the Treaty as
a means of gaining access to American government financing
when the U.S. prepaid the estimated present value of the first
thirty years of Canada’s share of the downstream power
benefits. 10
Regardless of the precise historical causes of the Treaty’s
creation, it was signed in 1961 and took effect following
ratification in 1964.
A.

Structures: What the Treaty Built and Why

There are four dams that were constructed through the
Treaty—Duncan, Keenleyside/Arrow, and Mica in British
Columbia, plus Libby in Montana—and each was built mostly
for storage rather than on-site electricity generation. 11 The
dams have always been capable of generating electricity but
their intended primary function at the time of construction
was to hold water so that the Columbia’s flow could be
controlled to better synchronize demand for electricity with
power generation at other facilities downstream.12 Electricity
is not like many other commodities in that it cannot easily be
stored for future use even though its reliability is evidently
essential to the functioning of an industrialized society and

9. A. Dan Tarlock and Patricia Wouters, Are Shared Benefits of International Waters
an Equitable Apportionment?, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y at 523, 529-30
(2007).
10. John Shurts, Rethinking the Columbia River Treaty, in THE COLUMBIA RIVER
TREATY REVISITED supra note 7, at 194.
11. Id. at 196.
12. Richard White, THE ORGANIC MACHINE: THE REMAKING OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER
77 (1995).
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economy. 13 An estimated 45 percent of the Columbia’s present
storage comes from water held back by the four “Treaty dams”;
without them, there would be a mismatch between when the
Columbia’s flow naturally peaks in late spring and the winter
months when demand for electricity (and by extension water
flowing through hydroelectric dams) is at its highest in the
Pacific Northwest. 14
B.

Stakeholders and Governance: Who Decides How the
Columbia is Managed?

The four Treaty dams were added to a river already being
used by other humans. The people and organizations who are
affected by the Columbia but who were not invited to
participate in Treaty negotiations have gained influence on its
governance through several subsequent federal, state, and
provincial acts but they are still officially not parties to the
Treaty. 15 Tribes who historically fished on the river, farmers
who rely heavily on its water for irrigation and transportation
of crops, the American and Canadian towns located near the
Columbia’s banks, and—importantly for a comment about the
electricity industry—owners of non-Treaty dams, have no real
seat at the table alongside the official Treaty “Entities” of BC
Hydro, USACE, and BPA designated by the American and
Canadian federal governments. 16 Several commentators have
noted the absence of a public process in the Treaty system’s
governance configuration as something that needs revision to
conform to contemporary ideas about fairness and democratic
process. 17 Other observers, not necessarily disagreeing with
such calls for change, have pointed out that the Treaty’s
origins—in an era when concerns about environmental and
social impacts were considerably different than they are
13. Leonard S., Andrew S., and Richard C. Hyman, AMERICA’S ELECTRIC UTILITIES:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 26 (2000).
14. Shurts, supra note 10, at 197.
15. Barbara Cosens, Changes in Empowerment: Rising Voices in Columbia Basin
Resource Management, in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED, supra note 7, at
61.
16. See Figure 1, Anthony G. White, The Columbia River: Operation Under the 1964
Treaty, in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED, supra note 7, at 54-55.
17. See, e.g., Eve Vogel, Can an International Treaty Strengthen a Region and
Further Social and Environmental Inclusion? Lessons from the Columbia River Treaty,
in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED, supra note 7, at 281, 290.
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today—likely enabled the creation of a system that would
probably not prove feasible in 2013. 18
Members of the official Entities counter claims that they do
not give enough voice to non-official parties by noting that
BPA, USACE, and BC Hydro are all public agencies that have
already incorporated many concerns into Treaty operations;
the system is not operated or governed in 2013 exactly as it
was in 1964. 19 Indeed, although only BC Hydro, USACE, and
the BPA are Treaty entities with ultimate decision-making
authority, several other international and domestic
agreements—namely the Pacific Northwest Coordination Act
and the Northwest Power Act in the U.S. and the Columbia
Basin Trust Act in British Columbia—give influence to nonEntity groups and may lend them a role in shaping any
changes to a downstream hydropower benefits recalculation. 20
The scope of this Comment, focused on that benefits
recalculation, does not allow for a direct discussion of most of
the Treaty system’s “non-official” stakeholders or how they
should or should not be included in ongoing decision-making
other than to note their presence and underline that within the
hydropower industry, the Treaty dams were neither the first
nor the largest on the Columbia.21
III. IS THE TREATY BROKEN? IF SO, WHAT ARE THE
OPTIONS TO FIX IT?
Not everyone agrees that the Treaty system as it currently
exists needs fixing. Some argue that though the Treaty itself
deals only with power and floods, the U.S. and Canadian
Treaty Entities have over the years together developed a
complex international scheme of subsequent protocols and
operating agreements that address goals like fish protection. 22
18. I.e., “The United States and Canada would never negotiate this particular treaty
today,” Shurts, supra note 10, at 226.
19. See Anthony G. White, supra note 16, at 59.
20. See Vogel, supra note 17, at 290.
21. The first hydroelectric project on the river was Rock Island Dam near
Wenatchee. Completed in 1933, it is owned and operated by the Chelan County Public
Utilities District. The largest in terms of generating capacity is Grand Coulee Dam,
opened in 1941 by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation with a capacity of 6,809 rate
megawatts. See Anthony G. White, supra note 16, at 56.
22. I.e., “[M]anagement of the Columbia River is as much about international
relations as it is about public administration within the U.S.,” Anthony G. White,
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If the Treaty as-is largely works, this line of thinking
continues, complete renegotiation in place of a continuing
evolution of the river’s management through existing channels
may ultimately end up doing more harm than good to
consumers and producers of electricity as well as to wildlife.
Writers in this group argue that, however imperfect the
Treaty, it is better than what preceded it and what would
replace it upon termination: a system for settling border
disputes based on the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty
supplemented by a bare bones flood control regime. 23
Many in both the electricity and wildlife camps, however,
argue (for different reasons) that the Treaty is no longer
workable long-term. Perhaps the most radical view is that the
river should be returned to its natural state, but few even
among those generally most in favor of decommissioning dams
see widespread removal of projects on the Columbia main stem
as a likely option given the importance of hydropower to the
Pacific Northwest. 24 As one commentator has noted, “[W]hat
we are dealing with here is a biological river that is also a key
component in a western North American electrical energy
system.” 25 A more pragmatic understanding of the value of fish
vis-à-vis hydropower would not seek removal of the Columbia’s
dams but would consider either terminating or modifying the
Treaty and the elaborate structure of international
coordination that developed around it. Advocates of change in
this vein note that such an approach could also mean lower
rates for power consumers. 26
supra note 16, at 54.
23. Lance Dickie, Roll On With an Updated Columbia River Pact, SEATTLE TIMES,
July 4, 2013, available at http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2020956392_
columndickiecolumbiarivertreatyxml.html; Chris W. Sanderson, The Columbia River
Treaty After 2024, in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED, supra note 7, at 249,
263.
24. Dam removal advocates in the Pacific Northwest, for example, focus mostly on
small-scale projects, none on the Columbia main stem. See generally, Michael C.
Blumm and Andrew B. Erickson, Dam Removal in the Pacific Northwest: Lessons for
the Nation, 42 ENVTL. L. 1043 (2012).
25. See Shurts, supra note 10, at 192.
26. Annette Cary, Better Power Rates Possible for Mid-Columbia Customers if
Columbia River Treaty Changes, TRI-CITY HERALD, 7 MAY 2013, available at http://
www.tri-cityherald.com/2013/05/07/2386456/better-power-rates-possible-for.html; see
also, Editorial, Columbia River Treaty Warrants Revisions That Are Balanced, YAKIMA
HERALD-REPUBLIC, 8 OCT. 2013, available at http://www.yakimaherald.com/news/yhr/
tuesday/1564629-14/columbia-river-treaty-warrants-revisions-that-are-balanced.
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Some commentators back unilateral termination because
they believe that getting rid of the Treaty would mean an end
to management for electricity generation but not for flood
control. Flood control as it currently operates will change in
2024 but cannot be unilaterally terminated as can power
generation; even if the Treaty ends, Canada is still obligated to
provide “called-upon” flood benefits to the U.S. 27 This stance,
which may seem extreme at first glance, is in fact advocated by
a group saying operations would change little. Such writers
argue that BC Hydro may make as much or more profit by
controlling its own dams than by getting a check from the U.S.
and say that little will change upon termination because the
province cannot significantly alter the way it operates Treaty
dams without substantially impairing its own ability to
generate the hydropower on which it has become dependent. 28
A final group seems to think that the solution is neither to
keep the Treaty intact nor to terminate it but to craft a new
system that better reflects social, political, and economic
concerns of 2014 and beyond. One scholar has identified six
means of implementing broad modification:
A. Renegotiate the treaty
B. Negotiate a “partner treaty”
C. Negotiate formal amendments
D. Negotiate and implement protocols
E. Incorporate new “Entities” or advisors
F. Adjust annual operating plans. 29
IV. PAYING BRITISH COLUMBIA: WHAT IS THE
“CANADIAN ENTITLEMENT” AND HOW DOES IT
AFFECTS A NEW TREATY?
The Canadian Entitlement is the annual share of the
electricity generated in the U.S. that is given back to British
Columbia as payment for operating the Treaty dams in
27. “[U]pon termination Canada would no longer need to store or release water from
the projects for any purpose related to generation in the United States . . . [and] the
United States would no longer owe Canada any share of downstream power benefits”
but “British Columbia’s responsibility to provide ‘called upon’ flood control will remain
even if the rest of the treaty is terminated.” See Shurts, supra note 10, at 202-03.
28. Id. at 229.
29. Matthew McKinney, Managing Transboundary Natural Resources: An
Assessment of the Need to Revise and Update the Columbia River Treaty, in THE
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED, supra note 7, at 84, 92-94.
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accordance with U.S. requirements. Or, as one pair of
commentators phrased it in summarizing the treaty’s purpose,
“Canada traded hypothetical lost hydroelectric generating
capacity and surplus flood control storage for money.” 30 The
Entitlement is calculated every year, six years in advance of
actual operations through an “Assured Operating Plan” which
takes into account water flows as if they were being managed
only for flood control and power generation. 31 A (very)
simplified equation is:
Downstream power benefits = Hydroelectric generation
in U.S. with Canadian storage – Hydroelectric
generation in U.S. without Canadian storage32
Canada receives half of the downstream power benefits
determined through this calculation, a requirement that comes
from the Treaty text. 33
It is worth emphasizing that because the basic calculation
itself is in the Treaty, any substantial change to the
Entitlement would probably require a new or modified Treaty,
not just something like a supplemental operating agreement. 34
While any discussion of possible changes to the Entitlement
calculation would need to be situated in the larger, ongoing
conversation about what to do with the Treaty system in 2014
anyway, the fact that the share of benefits is embedded in the
Treaty means that revising the calculation most likely goes
hand in hand with a major new, international agreement.
Changing the share of benefits is not really compatible with
only minor, “side” modifications, though the two countries have
to date proven adept at resolving similar problems posed by
transnational effects of hydroelectric dams in the Pacific
Northwest without new treaties.35
30. See Tarlock and Wouters, supra note 9, at 529.
31. See Shurts, supra note 10, at 199-200.
32. Id. at 198.
33. See Treaty, supra note 1, Art. V.
34. Shurts, supra note 10, at 225.
35. See generally, Nigel Bankes, Environment: Garrison Dam, Columbia River, the
IJC, NGOs, 30 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 117 (2004) (discussing resolution of the physical return
of power to Canada despite Treaty language requiring delivery at a location that was
unfeasible in 1998); see also, Matthew McKinney et al., Managing Transboundary
Natural Resources: An Assessment of the Need to Revise and Update the Columbia
River Treaty, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y at 307, 346 (2010) (discussing
the 2000 Libby Coordination Agreement); see generally, Paul Marshall Parker, High
Ross Dam: The International Joint Commission Takes a Hard Look at the
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How the Entitlement fits into a renegotiation option is far
less clear than how it is affected by scenarios of leaving the
system as-is or discarding it entirely. If nothing about the
Treaty is changed, the Entitlement would stay the same. If the
Treaty terminates, the Entitlement itself would disappear
even if operations remain substantially the same.
Mechanically, modification options A, B, and C (above) would
work with a new calculation while sub-options D, E, and F
would be incompatible. But this does not answer the
substantive question about the Entitlement: regardless of the
form a new agreement takes, if the Treaty is reworked, how do
the two countries decide how to split the costs? Or, as one
writer phrased it in exploring a different question about
change in the U.S. electricity industry, “Who pays and how
much?” 36 Focusing on the restructuring of North America’s
electricity markets is an attempt to help tease out principles
that may be useful in answering that question for the
Canadian Entitlement.
A.

Does the Entitlement Calculation Still Approximate
Shared Costs and Benefits; If Not, Why?

Assuming that the Treaty is in some way renegotiated,
amended, or replaced, how does one begin to determine how a
system of shared power benefits might fit into a new
international arrangement? One place to start is to ask if the
existing means of determining the Entitlement still
approximate the reality of how costs and benefits are shared
by the U.S. and Canada on the Columbia River. Four major
possibilities emerge from such an exercise:
1. Despite changes in the western electricity market,
the calculation methodology and its fifty-fifty benefit
split still roughly reflect the reality of cost and benefit
sharing by the two countries; the fundamentals of the
existing calculation can be incorporated into a new,

Environmental Consequences of Hydroelectric Power Generation—The 1982
Supplementary Order, 58 WASH. L. REV. 445 (1983) (discussing resolution of the High
Ross controversy without a treaty negotiated by the U.S. Department of State).
36. Paul Vercruyssen, Renewable Energy Integration Costs: Who Pays and How
Much?, 1 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 181 (2011); see also, Editorial, How Much for a
Modern Treaty?, WENATCHEE WORLD, July 3, 2013, available at http://www.
wenatcheeworld.com/news/2013/jul/03/how-much-for-a-modern-treaty.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol3/iss2/7

10

Kirkpatrick: The Columbia River Treaty's Canadian Entitlement: The Role of Lib

330 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 3:2

amended, or revised treaty;
2. The U.S. is paying for substantially more than it is
receiving in power and flood benefits from Canada; the
calculation needs to be changed;
3. The U.S. is paying for substantially less than it is
receiving in power and flood benefits from Canada; the
calculation needs to be changed;
4. The U.S. is paying for less than it receives in power
and flood benefits but is also receiving other benefits
(such as water to spill for wildlife protection) which
mean the Entitlement calculation approximates the
reality of shared costs and benefits by the U.S. and
Canada; the calculation may or may not need to be
changed.
Scenario 1, despite its apparent simplicity, is not without
proponents. In the view of one Canadian commentator, the fact
that the U.S. and Canada jointly calculate only gross benefits
and leave the potentially more contentious net benefit
calculation to be done individually is critical to managing the
river; the ease of not having to haggle over the value of
benefits makes the system work.37 In economic terms, one
might summarize this argument by saying that comparative
advantage 38 coupled with Coasian-like bargaining 39 results in
a sort of Pareto efficiency or Nash equilibrium 40 outcome
where both sides reach their optimal balancing of costs and
benefits. 41 Each country, based on its own calculus, can
negotiate up to the point that it is better off than it would be
without engaging in the Treaty system. This is a view that has
also drawn some support in the U.S. Pacific Northwest popular
press among those arguing that the U.S. could turn out
proverbially penny-wise and pound-foolish by terminating or

37. Sanderson, supra note 23, in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED 249, 266.
38. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,
Book IV, Ch. II (1776).
39. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. L. ECON. 1 (1960).
40. John F. Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, Ph.D. diss., Mathematics Dept.,
Princeton Univ. (1950).
41. For a similar, related application of some of these principles to hydroelectricity
trade between the U.S. and Canada, see Barbara K. Bucholtz, Coase and the Control of
Transboundary Pollution: The Sale of Hydroelectricity Under the United StatesCanada Free Trade Agreement of 1988, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 279 (1991).

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2013

11

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 7

2013]

THE CANADIAN ENTITLEMENT

331

substantially reducing the Entitlement. 42
There is likely some truth in this analysis, but it is at the
same time problematic in that it does not account for changes
in the value of benefits that cannot be remedied through the
use of supplemental operating agreements. From a purely
pragmatic standpoint, too, Scenario 1 (like calls to preserve the
Treaty as-is) does not seem prudent since it essentially takes
the position that nothing really needs to be changed, a view
that on the U.S. side does not appear to align with current
thinking inside the official Entities. 43 In fact, though they will
not make an official recommendation to the U.S. State
Department on what should be done with the Treaty until the
end of 2013, BPA and the USACE have already publicly stated
that there is a great mismatch between what Canada is paid in
Entitlement energy and the net benefits the U.S. is receiving;
they have estimated U.S. power benefits at as little as one
tenth of what they pay through the Entitlement calculation. 44
Scenarios 2, 3, and 4 at least contemplate the possibility of a
changed calculation. Overlaid on these is the question of
whether a disparity between benefits and costs stems from the
underlying methodology of the calculation used to estimate
benefits, the split of calculated benefits, or some combination
of the two. Stated differently, if the Entitlement calculation is
inaccurate, is this because it arrives at a totaling of benefits
that does not match reality or because the U.S. and Canada
split the value of those benefits equally despite the fact that

42. Lance Dickie, Roll On With an Updated Columbia River Pact: Update the
Columbia River Treaty But Nurture a Plan That Provides Water, Power, Flood Control
and Economic Opportunity For the U.S. and Canada, SEATTLE TIMES, May 9, 2013,
available at http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2020956392_columndickiecolumbia
rivertreatyxml.html.
43. I.e., BPA spokesmen Mike Hansen: “One of the things that is clear to us is that
the value for the Canadian [E]ntitlement post-2024 is worth significantly less than
half the current value,” in Scott Learn, Columbia River Treaty Between U.S. and
Canada Under Intense Review, OREGONIAN, May 9, 2013, available at http://www.
oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/04/columbia_river_treaty_between.html.
44. U.S. ENTITY, COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY 2014/2024 REVIEW: CANADIAN
ENTITLEMENT (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/Files/
Columbia%20River%20Treaty%20Review%20-%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20
Canadian%20Entitlement--FOR%20PRINT.PDF; U.S. ENTITY, COLUMBIA RIVER
TREATY REVIEW WORKING DRAFT OF A REGIONAL RECOMMENDATION: IMPROVING THE
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY (June 27, 2013), available at http://www.crt20142024review.gov/Files/CRTR%20working%20draft%20recommendation,%20June%2027
%202013.pdf.
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one country bears substantially more costs than the other? The
fifty-fifty split likely contributes to the inaccuracy but is not as
important for this Comment since a strong and relatively
straightforward case can be made for the former cause. If the
benefits to be divided are not correct, the division of those
inaccurate benefits is unlikely to approximate reality.
There is ample evidence that major assumptions underlying
the calculation are no longer sound and that the downstream
power benefits are much greater than those who created the
calculation predicted they would be. John Shurts of the
Northwest Power and Conservation Council identifies several
such suppositions held by those who helped create the
Entitlement calculation, several of which he argues vary vastly
from present realities.
First, those setting up the Entitlement calculation thought
that the value of hydropower was expected to decrease as more
thermal (coal and nuclear) plants were built in the Pacific
Northwest. 45 Larger, more economically efficient thermal
plants, the thinking went, would provide an increasingly
greater proportion of the region’s baseload power while hydro
would eventually be phased into primarily meeting peaking
and load-following demand. 46 These thermal plants did not,
however, materialize and as a result hydropower continues to
form between sixty and seventy percent of the Pacific
Northwest’s electricity supply. 47 Its value remains higher than
anticipated in large part because it continues to serve as a core
source of power for a region rather than a source than can be
used to supplement a cheaper base of thermal electricity. 48
Hydro still provides firm, baseload power while other, new
power sources—natural gas and wind—are used in the Pacific
Northwest for the non-firm peaking and load-following
functions that Treaty drafters anticipated for hydro.49
A second important assumption held by those who created
the Entitlement calculation is that the Pacific Northwest’s
electricity system, even if connected to the rest of the west to
temporarily sell surplus power, would remain in the long run

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Shurts, supra note 10, at 206.
Id.
Id. at 210; see FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 45.
See Shurts, supra note 10, at 212.
Id.
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mostly isolated from the rest of North America. 50 In hindsight,
and given California’s longstanding “looming presence” over
the U.S. Pacific Northwest in comparison to the much weaker
intra-regional economic pulls, this may seem less
understandable than 1960s ideas about the potential of
nuclear power.51 Nevertheless, there is no question that a
much larger, more integrated electricity market than that
envisioned by Treaty framers evolved.52
In the physical realm, the most significant change was the
Pacific Northwest-California direct current transmission
intertie. In Shurts’s estimation, the completion of a northsouth power interconnection was not originated by the Treaty
but was crucially aided by it; British Columbia, Oregon, and
Washington did not have enough population to consume the
amount of power generated by the new capacity but California
did. 53 The Treaty served as a major catalyst in getting the
linkage between the two Pacific regions actually built; 54 it was
part of a broader push by the American federal government
dating to the 1930s to upgrade the U.S. grid. 55 This
interconnection in the long run has allowed the Northwest and
the Southwest to trade their power supply with each other and
reduce the amount of overall peak generating capacity that
each needs in the winter and summer, respectively. 56 Shurts’s
case is persuasive and makes plain that the western North
American electricity market became, through integration,
much larger than Treaty negotiators envisioned in the 1950s
and early 1960s. 57
Another reason why the calculation may no longer reflect
50. Id. at 205.
51. Carl Abbott, That Long Western Border: Canada, the United States, and a
Century of Economic Change, in PARALLEL DESTINIES: CANADIAN-AMERICAN
RELATIONS WEST OF THE ROCKIES, at 203, 212-13 (John M. Findlay and Ken S. Coats
eds., 2002).
52. See, Shurts, supra note 10, at 204-06, 213.
53. Id. at 204.
54. Id. at 205.
55. Peter Z. Grossman, The Zenith of the Natural Monopoly System, in THE END OF A
NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER
INDUSTRY 100 (Peter Z. Grossman and Daniel H. Cole eds., 2006); accord Shelly P.
Battram and Reiner H. Lock, The Canada/United States Free-Trade Agreement and
Trade in Energy, 9 ENERGY L. J. 327, 329 (1988).
56. Shurts, supra note 10, at 205.
57. Id. at 213.
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the reality of how benefits and costs are shared—and which
bolsters Shurts’s argument even if he makes mentions of it
only in passing 58—is the fact that such markets are also now
not only integrated but liberalized. It is physically possible for
power generated in rural British Columbia to be consumed in
suburban San Diego and such a sale is protected by an
international legal infrastructure of cross-border contracts59
and multilateral trade agreements, discussed below. The
facilitation of this trade by these laws may also have helped
push the value of the Entitlement benefits higher than Treaty
framers imagined. 60
Post-World War II British Columbia wanted the ability to
sell power in American electricity markets and got it through
the Treaty. 61 But, because of the 1994 North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other changes in U.S. and
Canadian utilities law, the province can still sell that power in
the U.S. even if either the U.S. or Canadian federal
government decides to terminate the Treaty. NAFTA, and the
1987 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and 1994 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade it incorporated, guarantees
utilities in the U.S. and Canada the ability to sell into each
other’s markets. 62 A U.S. desire for an integrated energy
market was a driving force behind North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in the wake of the 1970s oil crisis 63 and,
as a result, its Chapter Six requires national treatment for
energy and prohibits minimum or maximum import or export
prices. 64
58. Id. at 210.
59. Id. at 213.
60. Unfortunately, a precise quantification of how much of the increase in value of
the Entitlement is attributable to these new laws is not possible here. Much evidence
exists, however, that there is usually a strong positive relationship between economic
growth and the rule of law. That correlation is applicable here where the market
became both bigger and safer for participants because contracts are given the extra
enforcement protection of international trade agreements. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam,
THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5 (2006);
Order in the Jungle: Economics and the Rule of Law, ECONOMIST, March 13, 2008.
61. Shurts, supra note 10, at 194.
62. Yulia Selivanova, Managing the Patchwork of Agreements in Trade and
Investment, in GLOBAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE: THE NEW RULES OF THE GAME 49, 66
(Andreas Goldthau and Jan Martin Witte eds., 2010).
63. John N. McDougall, DRIFTING TOGETHER: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CANADAU.S. INTEGRATION 144-45 (2006).
64. Selivanova, supra note 62.
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Just how far the limits of these protections extend is not yet
clear. Academic commentators have pointed out that state
renewable energy portfolio standards may not meet NAFTA
obligations 65 while private and public sector energy players on
both sides of the 49th Parallel are proving increasingly willing
to use the agreement to challenge regulations which they say
discriminate against hydropower. 66 What is apparent is that
electricity itself, whether produced by a government or
investor-owned utility, cannot be refused entry to either the
U.S. or Canadian market based solely on the country, state, or
province where it is generated. British Columbia no longer
needs the Treaty to sell electricity in the U.S., and in fact
makes this plain in its treaty review documents intended for
the general public. 67
NAFTA, however, is by no means the only measure that
creates a legal hedge around liberalized wholesale electricity
markets and reinforces the increased value of power capable of
being traded across western North America. Indeed, early
commentators noted that NAFTA was in some ways redundant
with the deregulation of North American electricity markets
that started in the mid-1980s both between the U.S. and
Canada and within each country. 68 In the U.S., where the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and its
predecessors have had authority over interstate wholesale sale
of electricity since passage of the 1935 Federal Power Act,
65. Joe Walsh, NAFTA Ramifications of Hydropower Restrictions in the WaxmanMarkey Bill’s Proposed Renewable Portfolio Standard (Suffolk U. L. School Working
Paper Series, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1417042; Thomas Alcorn, The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade
Program and Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs, 3 MICH. J.
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 2, 29 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2135956.
66. See, e.g., Nicole Mordant, Boone Pickens Challenges Canada on Green Power
Law, REUTERS, Jul. 14, 2011, available at http://ca.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/
idCATRE76D65T20110714; BC Hydro Plays NAFTA Card in Bid to Win Green Status
in California, VANCOUVER SUN, Oct. 21, 2011, http://www.canada.com/
story_print.html?id=6fe2c88a-304f-47dd-afd4-8f8d48145a40; Gordon Hamilton, Mercer
International Seeks NAFTA Ruling on BC Hydro’s Electricity Policies, VANCOUVER
SUN, May 2, 2012, available at http://www.vancouversun.com/business/Mercer+
International+seeks+NAFTA+ruling+Hydro+electricity+pricing/6548987/story.html
67. COLUMBIA BASIN TRUST, COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS (July 2013), available at http://www.cbt.org/crt/FAQ.html.
68. G.C. Watkins, NAFTA and the Energy Sector: A Bridge Not Far Enough?, in
ASSESSING NAFTA: A TRINATIONAL ANALYSIS 191, 213 (Steven Globerman and Michael
Walker eds., 1993).
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liberalization was driven largely by Washington, D.C. 69 The
1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) “jumpstarted” wholesale competition and the growth of a new class
of independent electricity generating firms through mandatory
“wheeling.” 70 This trend was furthered by Congress’s
broadening of authority for FERC to require open-access
transmission in the 1992 Energy Policy Act and 2005
amendments to both that act and to PURPA. 71 Deregulation
was not exclusive to (or perhaps most successful in) the
electricity industry, nor was it pioneered by the Carter and
Reagan administrations that adopted Alfred Kahn’s ideas on
changing the airline industry and eventually extended them to
telecommunications, railroads, and energy. 72 Margaret
Thatcher’s government in the U.K. is generally regarded as the
first to experiment in earnest with injecting competition into
traditional natural monopoly industries (as well as to
aggressively privatize government-owned enterprises, a trend
that was not as widely attempted in North America). 73
In Canada, where individual provinces own their natural
resources, Brian Mulroney’s federal government aggressively
attempted energy deregulation starting in 1984. 74 While this
proved successful with petroleum, in the electricity sector it
was the FERC’s gate-keeping of the U.S. market that
ultimately compelled provincial deregulation of wholesale
electricity. FERC’s Order No. 888 required liberalization of all
utilities joining regional transmission organizations and
selling into American markets, something that apparently
proved more persuasive than Ottawa’s attempts to negotiate
nationwide electricity deregulation.75 While this pattern did
not play out in the Pacific Northwest as it did in other parts of
North America, 76 within the province, BC Hydro now allows

69.
70.
71.
72.

Fred Bosselman et al., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13 (2006).
Id. at 819, 821.
Id. at 832-33.
Richard F. Hirsh, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM, 226-27 (1999).
73. See generally, Clint Bolick, Thatcher’s Revolution: Deregulation and Political
Transformation, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 527 (1995).
74. G. Bruce Doern and Monica Gattinger, POWER SWITCH: ENERGY REGULATORY
GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 32-34 (2003).
75. Id. at 84-88.
76. Walter R. Hall II et al., History, Objectives, and Mechanics of Competitive
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wholesale access to all producers and choice of electricity
supplier to industrial-size customers. 77
What does all this mean for a new Treaty? Most obviously,
the changes affect what the U.S. and Canada want out of a
new agreement and the value of what they realize under the
existing one. Coupled with physical integration of British
Columbia’s grid with the entire U.S. West Coast, legal
protection of BC Hydro’s ability to sell electricity into the U.S.
(and vice versa of U.S. electricity into British Columbia) makes
the downstream power benefits more valuable than originally
anticipated.
Quantifying precisely the change in the value of the
downstream power benefits from what was expected in the
1960s to what they actually have evolved to in 2013 is less
important than noting the direction and general magnitude of
the change. Both seem to be up, though perhaps this is
counterintuitive on first glance. Given that one of
deregulation’s goals is to lower electricity prices, 78 one might
ask why deregulation has not lessened the value of Northwest
hydropower. One reason is that western markets are larger not
just because of population growth but also because they are
both physically integrated and legally liberalized. A 2001
study, for instance, found that NAFTA was not the only
catalyst of change in the North American electricity industry
but that NAFTA did have “significant and discernible effects
on trade and investment flows in the electricity sector.” 79
Another reason is that in a liberalized wholesale market,
responsive sources of electricity are more valuable than less
responsive sources and hydropower is just such a responsive
source. 80
The integration of western North America into a single
Electricity Markets, in CAPTURING THE POWER OF ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING 1, 27
(Joey Lee Miranda ed., 2009).
77. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY/OECD, ENERGY POLICIES OF IEA COUNTRIES:
CANADA 2009 REVIEW 198 (2010).
78. Paul L. Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the
United States, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 31, 36
(James M. Griffin and Steven L. Puller eds., 2005).
79. Mary E. Kelly and Cyrus Reed, The CEC’s Trade and Environment Program:
Cutting-Edge Analysis But Untapped Potential, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH
AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 101, 106 (David L. Markell
and John H. Knox eds., 2003).
80. Shurts, supra note 10, at 210.
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wholesale electricity market makes hydropower more valuable.
The liberalization of the international market through NAFTA
and federal deregulation in both the U.S. and Canada at once
enhance the value of this electricity and make protection of
Canadian access to U.S. power markets in a new Columbia
River Treaty superfluous. Both illustrate the importance of
trends that could not be predicted a half century in the future
and support the argument for a system that can be adapted
more easily and more frequently.
V.

WHAT THEN SHOULD THE NEW CALCULATION BE?

This Comment discusses principles that should be
incorporated into a calculation, not a new equation
methodology. There are several reasons. Mainly, the sort of
elaborate, finely-tuned blend of scenario, sensitivity, and costbenefit analyses one can imagine using to choose a new
Entitlement calculation methodology does not seem
appropriate here. The BPA and USACE are already working
on such an analysis and the value that a Comment of this
scope can add seems limited; the report they already produced
on how the Canadian portion of the Columbia hydropower
system would function if the Treaty is terminated, for example,
employs modeling at a level of specificity and sophistication
that simply cannot be matched here. 81
Indeed, if this Comment were able to incorporate such a
highly technical analysis, there would be a strong risk of losing
sight of the proverbial forest for the trees. As one scholar
discussing the relationship between environmental protection
and electricity deregulation notes, the best “formula” for
solving environmental law issues rooted in the economic
problem of the commons requires not only calculations, but a
“big picture” check to make sure that incentives are correctly
aligned. 82 BPA and USACE have done good, necessary work

81. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, ASSESSING THE CANADIAN HYDRO
OPERATION POST-2024 IN THE ABSENCE OF A TREATY (Jan. 2012), available at
http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/Files/Final_Report_No_Treaty_Canadian_
Operations.pdf.
82. Victor B. Flatt, What Is the Best Formula to Protect the Environment in
Electricity Restructuring? Comment on the Environmental Impacts of Electricity
Restructuring by Karen Palmer and Dallas Burtraw, 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. POL’Y J.
225, 232-33 (2005).
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but one also needs to keep perspective. The calculation
methodology set up in the Treaty has itself, after all, always
been complex yet it does not seem to produce durable
accuracy. 83
Thus, the focus for this final section is on the principles and
assumptions that should underpin any new methodology
rather than steps on how to calculate it. Ultimately, given the
way western electricity markets have changed in the past sixty
years, it seems the best solution may be one that can employ
flexibility to mimic the exchange between the U.S. and Canada
in the market for water storage and coordination.
It seems plain that both countries understand some sort of
change to the Treaty system is coming, most likely including a
downward revision in Entitlement payments. While some
Canadians to date have hailed a new treaty as an opportunity
to collaboratively work toward salmon restoration in British
Columbia, for example, others bluntly predict the end of an
annual fiscal windfall for the Province. 84
That the downstream energy distributed back to British
Columbia to either consume itself or resell elsewhere in North
America does not approximate the value of the energy actually
generated in the U.S. is not really in dispute; the calculations
are based on a hypothetical, optimal amount of generation that
by law cannot include non-power and non-flood control
considerations. There is disagreement on the value of the
Entitlement itself, though this appears a smaller issue in large
part because both the U.S. and Canada acknowledge that any
estimate for future values depends in part on energy prices,
which change by the minute. British Columbia quotes
“Entitlement Revenue to B.C.” as between $100 million and
$320 million annually from 2002 to 2012 while the BPA and
USACE estimate annual “value to Canada” at between $200
83. Jonathan A. Lesser, Resale of the Columbia River Treaty Downstream Benefits:
One Road from Here to There, 30 NAT. RES. J. 609, 614 (1990).
84. Mark Hume, Revised Columbia River Treaty Could Restore Salmon Runs, GLOBE
AND MAIL, Aug. 14, 2013, available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/britishcolumbia/revised-columbia-river-treaty-could-restore-salmon-runs/article13749271;
Becky Kramer, Treaty Renewal Chance to Reopen Salmon Passages, SPOKESMANREVIEW, Sept. 26, 2013, available at http://www.spokesman.com/stories/
2013/sep/26/columbia-treaty-renewal-chance-to-reopen-salmon; Vaughn Palmer, B.C.’s
Financial Honeymoon Ends With Columbia River Treaty Anniversary, VANCOUVER
SUN, June 17, 2013, available at http://www.vancouversun.com/opinion/columnists/
Vaughn+Palmer+financial+honeymoon+ends+with+Columbia/8539063/story.html.
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million and $350 million. 85 The major question, then, centers
on the value of those non-power, non-flood benefits to the U.S.
in relation to the amount paid to British Columbia through the
Entitlement system.
It may not surprise many that this is tricky to answer;
several scholars have already addressed the difficulties posed
by trying to use traditional cost-benefit analysis in both the
electricity sector generally and the Columbia hydro system
more specifically. 86 BPA and USACE advocate a proxy for the
Entitlement’s value based on the replacement cost of a gasgenerating resource that could produce an equivalent amount
of energy. 87 U.S. utilities are open to a traditional cost-benefits
analysis method. 88 The Northwest Power and Conservation
Council, created by the 1980 Northwest Power Act, tracks fish
and wildlife costs in terms of direct expenditures, capital
investments, and foregone hydropower revenue. 89
The British Columbia (perhaps not surprisingly) argues that
this value is higher than does the U.S. Entity, hinting perhaps
that Entitlement payments capture the price tag that the U.S.
puts on those non-power and non-flood benefits: “B.C. believes
that coordinated water flows, made possible because of B.C.
water storage facilities, provides a value to the U.S. whether it
is used for salmon protection, power generation or other
economic, social and environmental benefits.” 90 And if one
85. PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVIEW
UPDATE - TREATY REVIEW QUESTION OF THE MONTH: DECEMBER (Dec.
2012), available at https://www.enewsletters.gov.bc.ca/Columbia_River_Treaty_
U.S.
ENTITY,
Review_eNewsletter/December_2012/Canadian_Entitlement/article;
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY INITIAL REPORT KICKS OFF PUBLIC PROCESS (July 2010),
available at http://www.crt2014-2024review.gov/Files/Columbia%20River%20Treaty
%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20report%20kickoff.pdf.
86. See Olivia Odom, Note, Energy v. Water, 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 353 (2012); see also
Nancy K. Kubasek and Chaz A. Giles, Dammed to be Divided: Resolving the
Controversy Over the Destruction of the Snake River Dams and Providing a Model for
Future Decision-Making, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y R. 675 (2001).
87. U.S. ENTITY, supra note 6.
88. Letter from the Columbia River Treaty Power Grp. to Stephen Oliver, U.S.
Entity Coordinator, Bonneville Power Administration and to Mr. David Ponganis, U.S.
Entity Coordinator, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Aug. 16, 2013) [hereinafter CRT
Power Group Letter].
89. NORTHWEST POWER AND CONSERVATION COUNCIL, 2012 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN
FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM COSTS REPORT: 12TH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
NORTHWEST GOVERNORS (May 2013), available at http://www.nwcouncil.org/media/
6867139/2013-04.pdf.
90. PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, supra note 85; accord PROVINCE OF BRITISH
ENEWSLETTER
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thinks of Canada as producer and the U.S. as consumer, from
the perspective of Paul Samuelson’s revealed preference
theory, 91 there is some merit to this position: the fact that the
U.S. has already chosen among alternative uses of what it
buys means it has assigned a value to those non-power and
non-flood control uses.
Even if one accepts Samuelson’s theory of consumer
behavior, however, it is probably apparent that its application
to this situation quickly becomes overly simplistic. Namely, the
Treaty does not conform to the conditions Samuelson
established as necessary for revealed preference to work. The
U.S. and Canada are not buyer and seller in a perfectly
competitive market, they are two nations who signed a treaty
under specific political circumstances in the 1960s and are
constrained through at least 2024 by the regime set up in that
document. Others who have examined hydroelectric dams on
the Columbia in the context of non-power benefits point out,
similarly, that there is a critical distinction in cost-benefit
methodology between willingness to pay and willingness to
accept, 92 a fact that casts more doubt on the notion that the
U.S. has already assigned long-term value to non-power, nonflood control benefits of coordinated river flows by choosing to
manage the Columbia as it does while paying the Entitlement.
Should, then, the U.S. and Canada attempt to hammer out a
new calculation methodology that tries to estimate the value of
non-power and flood benefits, acknowledging that payment
from such a calculation will likely be substantially lower than
the current Entitlement? That is certainly one option and
something that U.S. groups most opposed to the current
Entitlement
calculation—the
so-called
“Mid-Columbia
utilities”—appear willing to accept politically, provided they
and their ratepayer customers are not directly saddled with

COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND MINES, U.S. BENEFITS FROM THE COLUMBIA
RIVER TREATY—PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE: A PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
PERSPECTIVE (June 25, 2013), available at http://blog.gov.bc.ca/columbiarivertreaty/
files/2012/07/US-Benefits-from-CRT-June-20-13-2.pdf.
91. Paul Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumers’ Behaviour, 5
ECONOMICA 61 (1938). The theory holds (in brief) that the best measure of a
consumer’s preference is the consumer’s purchasing behavior.
92. Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. and Linda J. Graham, The Role of Rights in Benefit Cost
Methodology: The Example of Salmon and Hydroelectric Dams, 74 WASH. L. REV. 763
(1999).
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new environmental mitigation costs. 93 This consortium of
Pacific Northwest utilities advocates either termination of the
Treaty or an Entitlement based on actual incremental power
benefits, 94 including especially the value of that power if sold
outside the Pacific Northwest. A similar though less strident
criticism of the Entitlement enjoys support from some with
fewer direct financial interests in the formula who nonetheless
see the present calculation as outmoded:
[A]ctual dam operations are now so heavily determined
by non-power considerations, that to determine power
benefits as if an entire project operating purpose (not
present in 1960) did not now exist is silly. That does not
mean the relative values realized by the countries are
wrong or must change, just that the method of
determining benefits is unrealistic. 95
If the two countries can negotiate such a calculation, at least
in the short run doing so could prove a more seamless
transition than going without the Treaty “cold turkey” and
risking major disruptions, forecast and unforeseen, to a system
upon which so many depend.
But one theme that emerges from much of the literature on
the Treaty is the need for a much more flexible mechanism,
perhaps suggesting that a reconfigured Entitlement is not the
best way to determine how British Columbia should be
compensated. Shurts concludes his essay by reflecting on the
need for shorter forecast horizons because of uncertainty and
flexibility 96 while others discuss uncertainty, resilience 97 and
adaptability. 98 Looking more broadly at electricity networks
and markets worldwide, “innovation,” one set of scholars
remarks, “permeates the entire field.” 99 Indeed, flexibility is
93. CRT Power Group Letter, supra note 88.
94. Id.
95. Shurts, supra note 10, at 223; accord John M. Hyde, Columbia River Treaty Past
and Future, HYDROVISION 1, 21 (July 2010); accord Tom Karier, What Needs to Change
in the Columbia River Treaty, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 5, 2013, available at
http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2021546101_tomkarieroped06xml.html.
96. Shurts, supra note 10, at 244.
97. Gregory Hill et al., Uncertainty, Society and Resilience: A Case Study in the
Columbia River Basin, in THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED 333.
98. Craig W. Thomas, The Impact of Institutional Design on the Adaptability of
Governing Institutions: Implications for Transboundary River Governance, in THE
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY REVISITED 398.
99. Martha M. Roggenkamp et al., The Role of Networks in Changing Energy
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itself a principle advocated by BPA and USACE in their draft
treaty recommendation, 100 perhaps a recognition that benefits
sharing mechanism needs to be based on something other than
just a traditional capital budgeting timeline for a dam.
Some have proposed that flexibility could be facilitated
through a transboundary water-management organization
similar to the Great Lakes Commission. 101 Others, however,
object to the very notion of trying to coordinate ecological
management internationally as an unneeded additional layer
of coordination and expense. 102
If one of the problems with the Entitlement calculation is
that its distribution of financial costs and benefits differ
greatly from those of the market, perhaps one solution is to
begin thinking about how to structure a mechanism so that the
U.S.-Canada buyer-seller relationship can more closely
approximate the market conditions of Samuelson’s theory of
consumer behavior. Change is something markets (if correctly
designed) manage well. It would prove foolish, of course, to try
to impose such a model too literally: storage and management
of water flow for wildlife protection on the Columbia is not a
product that could ever be sold in a perfectly competitive spot
market; the product is unique, there is only one buyer and one
seller, and the two countries are not rational consumers in an
economic model. While without doubt similar and closely
linked culturally as well as economically and geographically, 103
the U.S. and Canada are two nations with their own
sometimes-idiosyncratic sets of laws and politics that shape
attitudes about energy management, 104 not generic rational

Markets and the Need for Innovative Solutions, in ENERGY NETWORKS AND THE LAW:
INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS IN CHANGING MARKETS 436 (Martha M. Roggenkamp et al
eds., 2012).
100. U.S. ENTITY, supra note 6.
101. Scott McKenzie, A River Runs Through It: The Future of the Columbia River
Treaty, Water Rights, Development, and Climate Change, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 921,
950 (2013).
102. CRT Power Group Letter, supra note 93.
103. See, e.g., Michael D. Behiels and Reginald C. Stuart, Introduction: Forging a
New American Continent; Transnational Theories and Studies, in TRANSNATIONALISM:
CANADA-UNITED STATES HISTORY INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (Michael D. Behiels and
Reginald C. Stuart eds., 2010).
104. See, e.g., Eric M. Uslaner, Energy Policy and Federalism in the U.S. and
Canada, in THE CANADA-UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP: THE POLITICS OF ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL COORDINATION 41 (Jonathan Lemco ed., 1992).
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actors in a market.
Further, one only needs to look to Enron’s much-cited
gaming of the deregulated California retail electricity market
in 2000–2001 to understand that market mechanisms have
limitations in a society dependent on electricity. 105 And one
should not forget that market integration was made possible
not just by liberalization, but also significant government
investment in transmission infrastructure, a condition that
some argue is essential for any restructured energy market to
succeed. 106 Still, attempting to find a model that infuses some
principles of a market scenario where buyers and sellers
determine the value of goods in real time may help avoid the
calcification of assumptions that nettles many under the
existing Entitlement calculation. Even setting up the formula
for downstream benefits sharing as something which could be
revised as often as every few years could help this “market”
between the U.S. and Canada better align costs and benefits in
both nations.
If there is a new calculation instead of some other
mechanism, it needs to incorporate costs of wildlife
management, sync payments as closely as possible to an actual
rather than hypothetical measurement of the energy
transmitted from U.S. dams, and reflect the fact that the value
of energy generated on the Columbia changes constantly in a
market composed not just of Washington, Oregon and British
Columbia but most of western North America. Even a solid,
sophisticated approach to reforming the calculation like one
proposed in the 1990s will not work if it does not incorporate
the impact of energy prices outside the Pacific Northwest and
the fact that this large wholesale market enjoys solid legal
protections. 107
Such a solution is admittedly only partially developed and
leaves much out. Perhaps most glaringly, the U.S. must still
face its long-standing and often heated internal conflict
between optimal power generation and optimal fish

105. Shurts, supra note 10, at 213; accord Jim Rossi, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND
PUBLIC LAW (2005).
106. Thomas-Olivier Léautier, Transmission Constraints and Imperfect Markets for
Power, 19 J. REGULATORY ECON. 27 (2001); accord William W. Hogan, Electricity is a
Federal Issue, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2003.
107. See Lesser, supra note 83, at 620.
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protection; 108 it seems plain that there is a tradeoff between
fish and power and a better downstream benefits system will
probably not end the “water wars.” This Comment does not
debate how different benefits should be prioritized or what
their relative values are but, rather, takes the position that
payment to satisfy those environmental requirements needs to
be explicitly broken out and constantly reevaluated in order for
payments to British Columbia to reflect what is actually
driving management of the river. The U.S. should not just
calculate flood and power benefits for the Pacific Northwest if
what it is really buying is timing of water flows for agricultural
use, recreation, navigation, fish protection, and electricity
generated on the Columbia and marketed across half a
continent.
If there is to be a new treaty and with it something
analogous to the Entitlement, the shapers of that new
mechanism ought to consider not only new environmental laws
but also new realities about how electricity is regulated,
managed, and marketed in the U.S. and Canada. Integration
and liberalization of western electricity markets in particular
helped give the Canadian Entitlement a value very different in
financial terms from what drafters of the calculation
envisioned. That vast divergence itself lends support to calls
for a new Columbia River downstream benefits compensation
system that is not only re-balanced for 2013, but flexible and
adaptable for future adjustments—a system perhaps built on
principles like those underlying the freer and more integrated
energy markets which helped sustain and grow the
Entitlement’s current value.

108. See, e.g., Melinda Kassen and Jack E. Williams, Energy, Water, and the Natural
Environment, in THE WATER-ENERGY NEXUS IN THE AMERICAN WEST 18, 27 (Douglas
S. Kenney and Robert Wilkinson eds., 2011).
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